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Author: United States Army 11th Airborne Division

Abstract: Submitted is a portion of the after action report concerning operations from 18 November to 25 December 1944 with the 11th Airborne Division, includes an operations narrative, intelligence narrative, supply and transportation narrative and personnel narrative which includes strength, awards and decorations and morale activities.

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Section King II

HEADQUARTERS
11TH AIRBORNE DIVISION
APO 468

28 May 1945

REPORT AFTER ACTION WITH THE ENEMY

OPERATION KING II, LEYTE CAMPAIGN

Submitted herewith is that portion of the report concerning operations from 18 November - 25 December 1944.

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Major General, U. S. Army
Commanding

FEB 25 1946

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
OPERATIONS NARRATIVE	2
INTELLIGENCE NARRATIVE	
1. Physical Geography	4
2. Summary of Enemy Situation	4
SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION NARRATIVE	
1. General	7
2. Transportation and Roads	8
3. Services of Supply	9
4. Aerial Resupply	10
5. Care and Evacuation of the Wounded	11
PERSONNEL NARRATIVE	
1. Strength	13
2. Awards and Decorations	13
3. Evacuation	13
4. Religious Activities	13
5. Postal Service	14
6. Morale Activities	14
7. General	14
ANNEX TO PERSONNEL NARRATIVE	15

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OPERATIONS NARRATIVE

The 11th Airborne Division departed ORO BAY, NEW GUINEA on 11 November 1944 in a convoy of nine ships for LEYTE, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. On 18 November the convoy anchored off the east coast of LEYTE, and the division landed without opposition on a 6000 yard front between ABUYOG and TARRAGONA. The first day was spent unloading cargo and sorting and storing equipment on the beach. Local roads were reconnoitered and bridges constructed where necessary.

The first mission which the division received (XXIV Corps FO No 28, 22 Ncv) was to relieve the 7th Infantry Division along the line BURAUEN - LA PAZ - BUGHO (see map) and to destroy all Japs in that sector. By 28 November the last elements of the 7th Infantry Division had been relieved, and the 11th Airborne Division had started its drive to close with the Japs, destroy them and gain control of the trails and passes that lead to the west coast through the central mountain range.

The first elements of the 11th Airborne Division pushed into the mountains on 23 November. Enemy action made it apparent that the Japanese would attempt to hold in depth along the line PATOG - ANANONG west through LUBI and MAHONAG to the headwaters of the TALISAYAN RIVER. As the situation developed, it became clear to the Japanese that in order to hold the mountains they must sever the division's supply line. All front line elements as well as long range patrols were dependent upon aerial resupply. The first such mission was flown 26 November and that means of supply continued throughout the campaign. Without it patrols would have been necessarily shortened and the scale and speed of operations reduced. Lives saved by air evacuation of wounded might otherwise have been lost.

The airborne attack on our airfields at BURAUEN had as one objective the elimination of this aerial resupply to our front line units. The ground attack was meant to be coordinated with the parachute attack and came at dawn 6 December from BURAUEN HEIGHTS. An estimated 200 Japs who had collected and organized in that area, moved on BURI strip intending to divert or divide our defenses. At dusk on that same day 350-400 Jap parachutists descended upon SAN PABLO and BURI airfields. The 127th Airborne Engineers, division supply personnel, elements of Headquarters Company, of 511th Airborne Signal Company, 408th Airborne QM Company, Hq Btry Div Arty and the entire 674th Para-Glider FA Bn acting as infantry destroyed the Japs in five days of heavy fighting which concluded on 10 December.

While the Jap counter-attack on the BURAUEN airfields was being repulsed, the 511th Parachute Infantry and the 2nd Bn 187th Para-Glider Infantry pushed relentlessly through the Jap mountain positions in the MAHONAG - ANAS passes. Because of the difficult terrain characterized by steep trails which, under almost daily rains, were but sticky, treacherous mud paths, the advance was slow. The strip at MANARAWAT was now the control point for the mountain fighting. This strip had been constructed by the 127th Airborne Engineer Battalion, and the division CP had moved there on 4 December. "A" Battery 457th Parachute FA Battalion had been dropped there on 5 December and supported the attacks to the west and north from that date until the close of the operation. The first Division Hospital was there, and the evacuation of wounded

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by jeep plane continued. When the LUBI - MAHONAG pass was secured, the second Division Hospital was parachuted in at MAHONAG, the west end of that pass. Evacuation to the west was made from this point after the trail to the coast had been wrested from enemy control. The series of attacks to accomplish this must be included in the fiercest fighting in the LEYTE campaign.

The main Jap supply line closely paralleled the division route of advance. The two were closest at MAHONAG, which place was secured by 12 December. Three days later, the division's control had extended to ANAS. On the 18th, after effective fire from the artillery at the cub strip, a third attempt to take ROCK HILL was successful. Only one trail led up to the knife-edge ridge which was ringed by wooded, nearly perpendicular cliffs. 432 dead Japs were counted that day.

The main and final attack came 23 December. The division commander established his CP on ROCK HILL to direct personally the BATTLE OF HACKSAW HILL. Attacking now with four battalions in column along the Jap trail, the division surprised and annihilated the sleeping enemy. The 2nd Bn 187th Para-Glider Infantry passed through all three battalions of the 511th Parachute Infantry and continued the drive making contact with elements of the 7th Infantry Division in the foothills on the western slope of the mountains near ALBUERA. 750 Japs were killed that day, and the BURAUEN - ALBUERA trail had been cleared of all organized hostile forces. Extensive, aggressive patrolling throughout this newly-won area prevented any portion of it from falling again into Jap hands. One company stayed in ambush along the trail for several days with excellent results.

While this force was fighting its way through the mountains, 2nd Bn 188th and 1st Bn 187th Para-Glider Infantry Regiments had contained large enemy forces in the hills northwest of ANANONG. By 22 December these strong points had been developed and the two battalions were prepared to attack. Engaged by the strongest Japanese forces encountered by the division, seven days of fierce fighting supported by the fires of three artillery battalions were required to neutralize the enemy forces. At the close of the period of this report, 25 December, the fight was still in progress.

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INTELLIGENCE NARRATIVE

1. Physical Geography.

a. Terrain.

The division Zone of Operation lay in Central LEYTE, running east and west across the island. Bounded on the east by LEYTE GULF, on the west by ORMOC BAY, on the south by the ABUYOG - BAYBAY Road, and on the north by a line running east to west through DJLAG - JULITA - LIBAS - GUINARONA - MT LOBI - MT MAAGONO and ALBUERA, it encompassed an area of approximately 600 square miles. The eastern half of this sector, which includes the southern end of the LEYTE VALLEY, is primarily low and swampy, while the western section is characterized by hills, mountains with precipitous cliffs, razor-back ridges, and plateaus.

b. Roads and Trails.

The main road in the Division sector was Highway No. 1, running from DULAG south to ABUYOG and thence west to BAYBAY. Originally all-weather, this road was of little use to the Division early in the campaign because of heavy rains.

The DULAG-BURAUEN road was the most important in the Division Zone, but like Highway No. 1, was in very bad condition at the beginning of the campaign. Only one-way traffic could be handled the greater part of its nine miles, and at times the road was closed entirely.

Throughout the rest of the valley, numerous unimproved roads and "jeep" trails were found which were usable only in dry weather.

From BURAUEN west there were no roads, and all movement was over foot trails. The only improved trail in the area was a Jap-built supply route which extended from ALBUERA on the West Coast to ANONANG; all others were steep, narrow, and made nearly impassable by heavy mud.

c. Rivers and Streams.

The MARABANG, DAGUITAN, LUBI and BITO RIVERS were the main waterways in the area, and none of these were navigable. Hundreds of small streams formed a network across the entire division sector. The rivers and streams generally flowed from west to east, and were shallow except following heavy rains.

2. Summary of Enemy situation.

Major enemy forces in Central LEYTE on 23 November 1944 consisted of:

- a. Remnants of the Japanese 16th Division in the LOBI Mountains where they had fled from the BURAUEN - DAGAMI Area.
- b. The 26th Division, at ORMOC - ALBUERA, recent arrivals from LUZON.

The Japanese plan, indicated in captured documents and confirmed by their actions, was to seize the airfields in the BURAUEN area by a coordinated attack of the 26th Division, remnants of the 16th Division and airborne troops on 5 December 1944.

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The 26th Division was to advance two regiments through the MAHONAG-ANAS pass, down the LUBI River Valley, and push eastward to BURAUEN. The 26th Engineer Regiment and 65th Engineer Battalion, with native labor, constructed a supply trail through the mountains of Western Leyte which they failed to complete. The rugged, difficult terrain and weather, coupled with lack of mechanical equipment proved too great a handicap. Only one regiment, with supporting artillery, reached the MAHONAG-LUBI area. The 3rd Battalion 13th Infantry (reinforced) (SHIGAMATSU FORCE, 1500-2000 officers and men) pushed forward along foot trails and contacted elements of the 11th Airborne Division from LUBI eastward. The SHIGAMATSU Force kept drawing away to the north and working eastward toward BURAUEN. All elements of the battalion were identified during the first week in December. A tapped wire at MAHONAG disclosed the following statement by the division commander: "The Americans have me encircled to the south; I have approximately one regiment east of the mountains." The 3rd Battalion 13th Infantry was directed to carry out the division part of the coordinated attack on BURAUEN independently of the remainder of the division "due to conditions of the trails." No mention was made of the interposing 11th Airborne Division. The SHIGAMATSU Force failed to meet the date of the coordinated attack, arrived at BURAUEN 10-11 December, five days late, launched a half-hearted night attack, which was repulsed by troops of the 11th Airborne Division, and withdrew into the mountains west of BURAUEN. In their efforts to withdraw to the west, they contacted elements of the 11th Airborne Division protecting the division supply trail, were scattered and annihilated piecemeal.

Remnants of the 16th Division were to attack the SAN PABLO and BURI airstrips from the northwest. Approximately 1500 men, only 500 of whom could be considered effectives, assembled in a valley 3600 yards west of BURI airstrip and on 6 December attacked to the east across Highway #17. Despite heavy losses, an estimated 200 reached a heavily wooded area north of BURI airstrip.

This group was later joined by remnants of airborne troops who had been pushed off SAN PABLO and BURI airstrips, fought for five days north of BURI and later west of BURAUEN where they were practically annihilated. Stragglers fled to the mountains near CANISLAGAN where they met the ineffectives of the 16th Division. These were gradually eliminated by artillery fire and patrol action.

The Airborne Troops, numbering 350-400 parachutists landed from approximately thirty-six DC-3 planes at dusk 6 December on SAN PABLO and BURI airstrips following a bombing run, 24 hours behind schedule. After destroying several liaison planes and a few drums of gas on SAN PABLO and inflicting some casualties amongst service troops on BURI, this force suffered 80 per cent casualties from elements of the 11th Airborne Division and joined the remnants of the 16th Division. A few parachutists were later killed in the LUBI Area.

The period from the 11th to 20th December was characterized by the continued destruction of enemy pockets of resistance in the ANAS-MAHONAG and LUBI-ANONANG areas. During this period it was established that the enemy's main line of defense was on the ridges east of the TALISAYAN RIVER and on the high ground approximately 5000 yards north of MAHONAG and was defended by units of the 26th Division and the 65th Independent Engineer Battalion, augmented by stragglers from the 16th Division. The following units of the 26th Division were identified: 26th Division Headquarters, 26th Division Engineer Regiment, 2nd Bn 12th Independent Infantry Regiment, and numerous 26th Division service units. They were attacked by elements of the 11th Airborne Division on

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23 December. The rout was complete, and the few survivors withdrew northwest in small and scattered groups toward the ORMOC VALLEY. 750 Jap dead were counted that day and the BURAUEN-ALBUERA trail was cleared of all organized hostile forces.

While this force was fighting its way through the mountains, other elements of the 11th Airborne Division contained large enemy forces consisting of remnants of the 3rd Battalion 13th Independent Infantry Regiment, 11th Independent FA Regiment, 16th Division Signal Unit, Kitano Co. of 16th Engineer Regiment, and elements of 26th Engineer Regiment in the hills northwest of ANONANG. By 22 December these strong points had been developed and at the close of the period of this report, 25 Dec, the fight was still in progress against this position.

By 25 December 1944 all organized resistance except in the ANONANG area had been broken in the division sector. The remaining Japanese were scattered into small, isolated groups, incapable of any further coordinated action.

The total counted enemy dead during the campaign reached 4286; prisoners of war totaled 12.

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SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION NARRATIVE

1. General.

On 20 October 1944 (A-Day), the 11th Airborne Division was stationed at DOBODURA, near USASOS BASE "B" at ORO BAY, NEW GUINEA. Warning orders were received 20 October, and Movement Orders were received 31 October, to depart BASE "B" 11th November 1944.

Initial plans for ship loading were prepared on the basis of loading approximately 8800 personnel, and 7000 DWT cargo, into 5 APA's (personnel carriers), 2 AKA's (cargo), and 1 APH (hospital) ships. Upon arrival of the naval convoy at ORO BAY on 4 November, Naval representatives, the Port Commander, and key 11th Airborne Division loading officers conferred. It was found that total cargo and personnel capacity acceptable to the ship commanders was 2,000 DWT and 1,500 men less than indicated by Sixth Army logistics. An additional APA was assigned to the division, 700 men were flown to FINSCHAVEN to take advantage of personnel space in an APA loading attached units there, and space for approximately 100 DWT was made available in a Liberty Ship loading out at the same time. The remaining 1200 DWT of vehicles, equipment and supplies were booked for future shipment and stored in USASOS dumps and in a warehouse made available by BASE "B". Of this, all vehicles and approximately 200 DWT of Class II equipment and supplies were received by 25 December 1944.

Loading was completed 10 November. All port facilities were made available to the division, and the Port Commander extended the necessary assistance. The convoy sailed 11 November 1944, and arrived off BITO BEACH, LEYTE, P. I. on 18 November 1944.

The Division Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4 was a member of a small advance detachment which flew to LEYTE before the convoy arrived, and marked the proper landing points on the beach for personnel and cargo.

All APA's were unloaded of personnel and cargo by 1800, 18 November, and these ships departed during the night. Unloading of the two AKA's continued steadily, interrupted by occasional air alerts, and was completed 23 November. During this period, the base camp and supply dumps were established.

The 11th Airborne Division was directed to relieve elements of the 7th Division in the vicinity of BURAUEN on 20 November 1944. At 0700 the following morning, the 511th Parachute Infantry Regiment moved by LCT to DULAG, where it was picked up with borrowed trucks and shuttled to BURAUEN. From this date until 10 December, troop movements from Base Camp to forward areas were accomplished under the difficulties imposed by a shortage of transportation, deeply mired roads, and the lack of bridges along the beach highway. The movements were accomplished by using one LCT assigned to the division, 3 LCT's borrowed intermittently from the 7th Division, and 10 DUKW's, which were used to carry vehicles and personnel to DULAG, with movement therefrom to the vicinity of BURAUEN by truck.

On 25 November, the Division Forward CP was established in the vicinity of SAN PABLO AIR STRIP #1. Aerial resupply to the troops west of BURAUEN and in the LAKE DANAO sectors was started 26 November, and became the principal means of supply transport until the end of the operation. (This subject is covered in

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detail in Item 4 of this report.) Carabao trains, weasel trails, and 2½ ton truck routes up river beds were tried, but only the carabao trains proved successful.

An estimated 350-400 Japanese parachutists landed on SAN PABLO STRIP #1 on the evening of 6 December, and either destroyed or damaged the liaison planes and supply dumps located on the strip. The attackers were driven from the strip by 1400 the next day. Supplies were brought up immediately to replenish the dumps, repairs were started on damaged liaison planes, and a few aerial resupply missions were flown that afternoon. Five liaison planes were loaded by the 5th Air Force, and aerial resupply continued without further serious interruption.

Division Engineer missions included the construction of an access road from Base Camp to Highway No. 1, maintenance of roads and bridges in the division sector, construction of liaison plane landing strip at MANARAWAT, south of LUBI, and improvement of the trail westward from MAHONAG to the vicinity of ALBUERA. In addition, necessary storage, maintenance, and packing sheds for parachutes and other airborne equipment were constructed by the 127th Airborne Engineer Battalion.

As of 23 December 1944, the 511th Parachute Infantry had made contact with the 7th Division on the west coast, and at the close of the period reported upon, troop movements to Base Camp from forward areas had begun.

2. Transportation and Roads.

The division landed at LEYTE during the rainy season, and all transportation was severely handicapped as a consequence. The following listing of the main highways, with pertinent remarks about each, will picture the condition:

<u>Highway</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Beach Road, BITO BEACH TO DULAG	Seven unbridged streams, until final bridge completed 23 Dec. Amphibious ferry service required.
Highway #1 BAYBAY - ABUYOG - DULAG	Inaccessible from Base Camp until Division Access Road completed 27 Nov. Road impassable at one place north of TARRAGONA during entire period.
DULAG - BURAUEN Highway	Muddy, open only to one way traffic for most of period. Road impassable opposite SAN PABLO STRIP #2 except by tractor and winching.
BURAUEN - DAGAMI - TANAUAN ROAD	Impassable section between BURAUEN and DAGAMI. Restricted except on rare occasions.
LA PAZ - MAYORGA ROAD	Tractor tow required for 2½ ton trucks.
ABUYOG - BUGHO ROAD	Provided MSR when bridge completed by XXIV Corps over BITO RIVER 30 Nov.

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During the active period of the campaign, heavy dependence was placed on the LCT and 10 DUKW's assigned to the division, supplemented by intermittent loan of 3 LCT's by the 7th Division. Completion by the division engineers of the Access Road to Highway #1 on 27 November, and the construction of a bridge by XXIV Corps Engineers over the BITO RIVER by 30 November, opened up the ABUYOG - BUGHO MSR. An access road for Route #1 to BEACH ROAD at XXIV Corps, which was completed 17 December, provided a route for all vehicles from Base Camp to the forward areas.

All portions of the division sector west of BURAUEN could be reached only by foot trails through the jungles and mountains. Carabao trains were used extensively to reach troops between AMERICA and LAKE DANA. One 40-carabao train and an additional 22-carabao train reached MANARAWAT STRIP over the trail, but could go no further because of terrain.

Several attempts were made to develop additional supply routes by running weasels and 2½ ton trucks up stream beds, but the experiments were unsuccessful.

3. Services of Supply.

During the KING II operation, supply dumps were operated as follows:

<u>Dump</u>	<u>Class of Supply</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Base Camp BITO BEACH	I, II, III, IV, V	For supply of troops in the vicinity of BUGHO and BAYBAY.
DULAG	I, II, III	Drawn from Sub Base K dump, and delivered to LA PAZ area, SAN PABLO STRIP #1, Division CP.
DIVISION CP, SAN PABLO	I, II, III, IV	Served troops in CP area, and casuals.
SAN PABLO #1	I, II, III, IV, V	Liaison Plane aerial resupply base.
SAN PABLO #2	I, II, III	Originally established for aerial resupply. When this activity moved to SAN PABLO #1, stocks at SAN PABLO #2 were drawn on by troops vic BURAUEN until exhausted.
BURAUEN	I, II, III, IV, V	A division representative was stationed at this 5th Air Force Dump to draw needed supplies for troops west of BURAUEN.
TACLOBAN	I, II, III, IV, V	Aerial resupply base, C-47 planes.
ASP #5 and #6 between DULAG and BURAUEN	V	Allocations set up for all ammunition requirements.

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Five additional supply points established in the mountains were stocked by aerial delivery, and supplied troops in close proximity thereto. These forward dumps at MANARAWAT STRIP, CATABAGAN, TAKIN, ANONANG, and MAHONAG were primarily for Class I and V supply.

Particular difficulty was encountered with Class II supplies because of excessively wet weather. Frequently, soles and heels came off boots after two or three days of walking in the mountains, and constant rain caused the disintegration of clothing, field equipment, and weapons.

4. Aerial Resupply.

The terrain over which the division fought was passable only by foot trails. Two carabao trains were able to proceed as far as MANARAWAT STRIP, but were unable to negotiate the trail west of that point. Consequently the principal means of supply of forward elements was by air, using C-47 Transport, and L-4 and L-5 liaison planes.

a. Delivery by C-47.

Sixth Army agreed to make available two to six C-47 Sorties daily from TACLOBAN. The necessary supplies were drawn, packaged, and dropped by personnel of the 11th Air Cargo Squadron. Resupply by C-47 planes made possible the delivery of substantial quantities in one flight; however, the effectiveness of this activity was limited. It was necessary to order C-47 resupply missions from 24 to 48 hours in advance. Many scheduled flights were cancelled because of heavy deliveries to other Sixth Army units, lack of fighter cover, and the prevailing bad weather which kept drop zones closed in except for short periods during the day. The small drop zones were difficult to hit from the relatively fast C-47's. In many cases the only available drop zones were located in pockets in the mountains, and the C-47's could reach them only by a diving action. One C-47 crashed when the pilot was unable to pull out of the dive in time to clear the mountain just opposite the drop zone.

On 15 December, the division Air Liaison Officer and a detachment of 32 men from the Division Parachute Maintenance Company were sent to TACLOBAN to aid in this activity. A dump of 7000 rations was established and maintained at TACLOBAN, and additional loads of ammunition and other supplies were trucked to this point as needed. Permission was obtained from Fifth Air Force to use one C-47 from the Air-Sea Rescue Squadron when it was not engaged in rescue missions. Direct radio communication was established between Division CP and the aerial resupply party to facilitate last minute changes in priority, and to transmit weather information affecting the drop zones. This detachment at TACLOBAN not only increased the total tonnage dropped by C-47, but also imparted flexibility and liaison control to the missions flown by the 11th Air Cargo Squadron. As the operation progressed, C-47 missions were concentrated on the delivery of rations to forward supply dumps, which made it possible for liaison planes to deliver greater quantities of other types of supply.

b. Delivery by Liaison Planes.

Although the load carried by an L-4 plane was limited to approximately 200 pounds, and that by an L-5 to 400 pounds, this type of delivery had several advantages. Liaison planes could make greatest possible use of short breaks in the weather; they could drop supplies at "pin point" targets along the trail; they could take off immediately to deliver an item of supply requested from the front.

SECRET

The first supply drop from a liaison plane was made on 26 November. The original flights were made from SAN PABLO STRIP #2, where small dumps of Class I, II, and III supply were established. On 29 November, permission was obtained to use uncompleted SAN PABLO STRIP #1 as a liaison plane supply base. A provisional aerial resupply team was organized, and the various supply services established bases at SAN PABLO STRIP #1. Initially, 9 L-4, and 2 L-5 planes were used for aerial resupply. All but one of these planes were destroyed when Japanese parachutists attacked the strip on the evening of 6 December. Fifteen planes and pilots of the 25th Liaison Squadron were made available immediately by Fifth Air Force, and continued aerial resupply work during the remainder of the operation. Occasional use was also made of liaison planes loaned by XXIV Corps and the 96th Infantry Division. This activity grew to the point where 176 sorties were flown and 19 tons of supplies and equipment were delivered on the peak day.

In addition to delivering supplies, liaison planes were also used to drop personnel in forward areas. The first jump from an L-4 plane was made by the Executive Officer, 511th Parachute Infantry, on 28 November 1944, when he went forward to take command of elements of the regiment.

On 30 November, 1st Battalion, 511th Parachute Infantry, occupied a small plateau at MANARAWAT, south of LUBI, which appeared to be suitable for a liaison plane strip. An Engineer Officer and a platoon of Engineers jumped from liaison planes and constructed a strip capable of accommodating an L-4 plane. The first L-4 plane landed at MANARAWAT STRIP on 3 December 1944. Subsequently, MANARAWAT STRIP became a forward supply depot, CP for the Division Advance Command Echelon, site of a hospital (discussed in Paragraph 5), and a position for a battery of field artillery. On 4 December the Assistant Division Commander, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, and a representative force of the staff sections reached the strip by parachute and air landing from liaison planes. Later, a battery of the 457th Parachute Field Artillery Battalion reached the field by parachute from C-47 planes, and two platoons of riflemen for the defense of the strip by parachuting from liaison planes. Still later, a parachute surgical team was jumped to this field.

One L-4 was fitted out as an improvised ambulance plane by placing a plywood litter from the rear of the front cockpit seat into the fuselage, and was used to evacuate wounded from the strip.

During the early days of the operation, liaison was maintained with front line elements by flying a division staff officer, equipped with radio, to their positions twice a day. The small planes also dropped daily news bulletins, ice cream for hospital patients, and gift packages for front line troops.

5. Care and Evacuation of the Wounded.

Initially, evacuations of casualties were made by the 221st Medical Company to the 76th and 165th Station Hospitals at DULAG, and later to the 44th General Hospital at BURAUEN.

The difficulties involved in evacuating casualties from the mountains were anticipated by attaching to the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 511th Parachute Infantry, a platoon of the 221st Medical Company, and also a parachute surgical team consisting of three surgeons and ten enlisted surgical technicians. As soon as these elements reached MANARAWAT STRIP, a hospital equipped to give definitive medical and surgical care was established. Native type shelters were constructed for use as wards, and an operating room was dug in.

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The necessary medical and surgical supplies were dropped by parachute. Since this hospital was so well equipped, the problem of evacuation was not as urgent as it would have been, were the facilities less adequate. "Walking Wounded" patients were cared for until they were able to accompany patrols returning to the rear. Litter patients were held until the tactical and supply situation permitted the landing of the ambulance plane, at which time they would be flown to SAN PABLO STRIP #1, and transported by ambulance from there to a Station or General Hospital. A total of 46 patients was evacuated from MANARAWAT STRIP by air.

The presence of this hospital in the forward area made it possible to return to duty slightly wounded or sick patients who would otherwise have been evacuated. Furthermore, it avoided the necessity of weakening fighting forces to provide litter bearers and guards for return of casualties to the rear. To carry a litter from MANARAWAT STRIP to BURAUEN would have required 8 to 12 bearers for each litter, in addition to the necessary security guard, and would have taken two days' time.

When the enemy was engaged in the MAHONAG-ANAS area, additional hospital facilities were needed because of the density of casualties, and the distance and terrain over which it would be necessary to carry wounded to the MANARAWAT Hospital. Immediate arrangements were made to jump from liaison planes another Parachute Surgical Team of 3 Surgeons and 10 enlisted technicians to MANARAWAT STRIP, and to drop the necessary hospital supplies at MAHONAG. Personnel marched to MAHONAG and set up a hospital similar to the one at MANARAWAT. This was accomplished at least four days sooner than would have been possible by any other means.

There were two possible ways to evacuate casualties from MAHONAG; litter carry from MAHONAG to MANARAWAT STRIP and from there by air, or litter carry to the west coast. Again, the problem of evacuation was not immediately urgent because of the hospital facilities available. A reconnaissance patrol to the west coast found a trail suitable for use in evacuation, but patients were held at the MAHONAG hospital until the 511th Parachute Infantry cleared the enemy in the ANAS pass on 23 December.

Arrangements were made with the 7th Division to have ambulances at their truckhead east of ALBUERA, and a convoy of litters and walking wounded travelled from MAHONAG to the west coast. A detachment of engineers worked on the trail previously to prepare it for the convoy. A total of 168 patients were evacuated from the MAHONAG Hospital before Christmas Day.

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PERSONNEL NARRATIVE

1. Strength.

At the beginning of the KING II Operation, the division was at full T/O strength. More than 3,000 additional parachutists had been qualified in the division Parachute School conducted at DOBODURA, NEW GUINEA, and all gliderists had received a refresher course at NADZAB, NEW GUINEA, through the cooperation of the 54th Troop Carrier Wing.

Battle casualties during the operation were 40 officers and 467 enlisted men, as detailed in Table No. 1.

Eight replacements, all officers, were received during the campaign.

2. Awards and Decorations.

Prompt recognition of outstanding gallantry and performance of duty in combat was accomplished by speedily publishing in orders awards of the Silver Star, Bronze Star, Air Medal, and Purple Heart, under authority delegated to the Division Commander. A total of 543 decorations, detailed in Table No. 2 were awarded during the campaign, and contributed to a high state of combat morale.

Recommendations for the award of one Congressional Medal of Honor and two Distinguished Service Crosses were sent to higher headquarters a few days after the acts of heroism had been performed.

3. Evacuation.

The detailed story of evacuation and care of the wounded is covered in the SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION NARRATIVE of this report. The principal effect of the division's program of establishing hospitals in the forward areas was that evacuations could be deferred until the tactical situation made them feasible, thus avoiding the reduction of effectives at the fighting front to provide litter bearers and guards. It was also possible to care for lightly wounded or cases of illness and return them to front line duty without evacuation.

4. Religious Activities.

Six Protestant and two Catholic Chaplains were assigned to the division during the KING II operation. No Jewish Chaplain was available, but the religious needs of men of this faith were met through services conducted by an enlisted man of the division who was a lay reader. Religious services for all denominations were conducted regularly. Helpful assistance was given by Catholic Chaplains of the 38th Division and the 44th General Hospital in conducting masses for the men of the division, particularly in the rear areas, making it possible for the Catholic Chaplains of the division to serve the men in the forward areas.

When the hospitals were opened at MANARAWAT STRIP and MAHONAG, Chaplains were jumped in by parachute for duty at the hospital, and to serve troops in the immediate area.

The Christmas Season was observed by appropriate religious services in both forward and rear areas. Sheets containing the words of Christmas carols and other suitable material were dropped to forward areas by liaison plane to assist in conducting Christmas services.

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Burial services for all dead were properly conducted by a Chaplain.

5. Postal Service.

The division's postal section provided adequate service in the dispatch of outgoing mail, but the delay in receipt of incoming mail was a source of some discouragement. Mail received by the division was dispatched promptly to front line troops, and a forward echelon of the postal section was set up to expedite delivery. Mail deliveries to forward areas were accomplished by liaison planes. Only a small fraction of the Christmas packages sent to the division was received during the Christmas Season. Such Christmas package mail as did reach the division was in poor condition, and showed the effects of rain and weather.

6. Morale Activities.

Special Service, Information and Education Officers and American Red Cross Field Directors cooperated to provide diversion and relaxation for the troops under combat conditions.

Motion pictures were shown whenever the tactical situation permitted. A motion picture projector, generator and films were flown to the hospital at MANARAWAT STRIP to provide entertainment there.

On 18 December, two units of the division band started a march over the trail with their instruments to provide entertainment and recreation. They played at both forward hospitals, and also for troops in bivouac. The observance of Christmas was aided greatly by the music provided by these units.

A daily, mimeographed newspaper was published by the Information and Education Section, named "THE STATIC LINE", which summarized latest radio news broadcasts, and included material from the Army News Service and Camp Newspaper Service. Copies of this newspaper were dropped to troops in the line daily, and were eagerly awaited.

Ice cream machines purchased by the division were operated in the rear echelon by personnel of the Special Service Section. Daily deliveries of ice cream were made to both hospitals by plane. A regular schedule was set up to provide ice cream for all units of the division on a pro-rata basis.

Sufficient Christmas packages to provide one for each man in the division were supplied by the American Red Cross Field Director, and all packages were delivered to reach the men by Christmas Day.

All elements of the division were provided with turkey for Christmas dinner. Troops in the combat area with no regular messing facilities received canned turkey, and enjoyed their fresh turkey dinner when they were withdrawn from the line.

7. General.

Despite the hardships of weather and terrain, the combat morale of the division remained high, and there was eagerness to close with the enemy.

A liaison officer from the G-1 section was in contact with all units throughout the operation to assist in the preparation of casualty and other personnel reports. At the close of the operation, all dead and wounded had been accounted for, and all records were completed and sent to higher headquarters.

ANNEX TO PERSONNEL NARRATIVE

SECTION I	CASUALTIES
SECTION II	AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
SECTION III	ROSTER OF OFFICERS

SECTION I - CASUALTIES

<u>Type of Casualty (Battle)</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Killed in Action.....	14	115
Died of Wounds.....	0	28
Died of Injuries.....	0	5
Seriously Wounded.....	4	52
Seriously Injured.....	0	5
Lightly Wounded.....	19	233
Lightly Injured.....	1	17
Missing in Action.....	<u>2</u>	<u>12</u>
	40	467

SECTION II - AWARDS AND DECORATIONS

Silver Stars.....	69
Soldiers' Medal.....	6
Bronze Stars.....	240
Air Medals.....	80
Air Medal Oak Leaf Clusters.....	10
Purple Hearts.....	<u>138</u>
	543

SECTION III - ROSTER OF OFFICERS

Swing, Joseph M.	Maj Gen	03801	USA	RA
Pierson, Albert	Brig Gen	011838	USA	RA
Schimmelpfennig, Irvin R.	Col	018046	GSC	RA
Conine, Robert E.	Lt Col	024393	AGD	RA
Cozier, Allen R.	Lt Col	0202208	JAGD	ORC
Crane, James L.	Lt Col	0357392	FD	NG
Crawford, William R.	Lt Col	020797	GSC	RA
Heaton, Sidney A.	Lt Col	0358740	IGD	ORC
McGowan, Glenn J.	Lt Col	0290985	GSC	ORC
Muller, Henry J., Jr.	Lt Col	024508	GSC	RA
Pensack, Joseph M.	Lt Col	0362751	CWS	ORC
Phillips, Hudson B.	Lt Col	018653	ChC	RA
Quandt, Douglass P.	Lt Col	020605	GSC	RA
Regnier, Francis W.	Lt Col	022699	MC	RA
Albarano, Ralph J.	Maj	0394309	INF	ORC
Burgess, Henry A.	Maj	0411435	GSC	NG
Ciceri, John G.	Maj	01285385	INF	AUS
MacKinnon, Harry L.	Maj	01685958	MC	AUS
Manley, Charles E.	Maj	0372155	MC	NG
Nelson, Waldo	Maj	0351054	AGD	NG
Smith, Edwin F., Jr.	Maj	0325548	GSC	ORC
Widmyer, Earl G.	Maj	0328516	GSC	ORC
Albade, Wells T., Jr.	Capt	0453701	INF	AUS
Carnahan, David H.	Capt	01823564	INF	AUS
Dunne, Edward J.	Capt	0479493	ChC	AUS

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Ewing, Nathaniel	Capt	0410780	INF	NG
Hill, Howard E.	Capt	0423664	VC	ORC
Johnston, Benjamin H.	Capt	0340581	IGD	ORC
Knoderer, John R.	Capt	025432	DC	RA
Moore, Harmon D.	Capt	0486244	ChC	AUS
Moseley, Arthur L.	Capt	01310750	INF	AUS
Schloth, William J.	Capt	0339137	INF	ORC
Walker, Clarence C.	Capt	0394588	INF	NG
Watson, James W.	Capt	01001491	AGD	AUS
Wyman, Eugene W., Jr.	Capt	01000499	AGD	AUS
Linstrom, John E.	Capt	0463857	INF	ORC
Detweiler, Meade D. III	1st Lt	0514701	FA	ORC
Murphy, Kenneth A.	1st Lt	01037193	CWS	AUS
Palmer, Cletus T.	1st Lt	01280379	FD	AUS
Peternich, Henry M.	1st Lt	01544534	MAC	AUS
Santare, Carmine A.	1st Lt	01294909	INF	AUS
Shea, Daniel H.	1st Lt	01000861	AGD	AUS
Watts, William F.	1st Lt	01296775	INF	AUS
Dobkin, Ben	2nd Lt	01052326	CAC	AUS
Ensrude, Vernon R.	2nd Lt	01325795	INF	AUS
Nevis, Leonard J.	2nd Lt	0519764	CAC	ORC
Kornfeld, Edward	2nd Lt	01004794	AGD	AUS
Reid, Henry J.	2nd Lt	01302522	INF	AUS
Hoffman, Herbert E.	CWO	W2106277		AUS
Jacobs, Edward W.	CWO	W2124477		AUS
Ridgeway, Gerald W.	CWO	W2106273		AUS
Balsamo, Joseph P.	WOJG	W2106283		AUS
Riviere, Orrin A.	WOJG	W2127808		AUS


Officers attached from other organizations:

MacLeod, John H., Jr.	Capt	0409217	FA	ORC
Seay, Joseph B.	Capt	0292956	CE	ORC
Meaney, Michael J.	1st Lt	0390464	INF	NG
Nalley, John A.	1st Lt	01002823		AUS
Neff, Donald E.	1st Lt	0534919	FA	AUS
Repplier, Banning	2nd Lt	0915950	CE	AUS

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MAD No. 3

DISPOSITION OF ELEMENTS
of 11th AB DIV ON DEC 6



- XX 11 Rf Ech
- B 152
- 674
- 675
- C 408(-)
- S 511(-)
- 711
- 221(-)
- D 152
- E 152

ENROUTE TO
SAN PABLO

LEYTE ISLAND

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
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MAP No 2

DISPOSITION OF ELEMENTS OF
11th AB DIV ON NOV. 28 1968
RELIEVING THE 7th DIVISION



LEYTE ISLAND
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